Abstract Typical contracts assign both coercive and non-coercive means of power to the principal's side, providing the agent with a comparably small range of countervailing anti-power. Initially agents are therefore vulnerable to opportunistic principal behavior and will rationally anticipate this threat upon signing a contract. In this paper we analyze various forms of power and explain their asymmetrical allocation in the franchising industry. We demonstrate how franchisors restore those shifts in power that seem to disorder the desired balance by performing contractual, financial and organizational adjustments. The nature of these measures suggests that franchisors should cooperate with agents despite their freedom to behave opportunistically. According to empirical data, the better a franchisor is able to credibly alleviate a franchisee's fear of being exploited by principal opportunism, the stronger the growth generated in the entire franchise system that embraces both the company-owned and the franchise arms.
Introduction
This paper addresses both franchisees and franchisors. While we explain with respect to the former, why it is important that franchisors hold substantial powers when running a franchise system successfully, from the perspective of the franchisors we propose how and why these powers must be applied accurately for the benefit of all system members.
Driven by our interest in the organization of franchise chains, this paper builds on the insights gained from two earlier papers.
2 Both papers cover a common, but rarely researched phenomenon in franchising called the "plural form" -a term relating to the parallel use of company-owned and franchise outlets within the same organizational structure. 3 It is the unexpected stability of this special hybrid form that should encourage researchers to examine it more closely. Among the findings of Ehrmann/Spranger (2004a , 2004b on the character of the plural form, the following five aspects are relevant to the remaining analysis:
Firstly, the income streams a franchisor generates from either of the two distributional channels differ greatly. Whereas the average franchisee outperforms the average companymanager purely in terms of generating sales, the standard franchisor extracts more profitgross profit and in terms of return on capital -from each single company unit. 4 Secondly, plural franchise chains have proven more profitable than wholly franchised systems.
Thirdly, despite these economic effects, chains do not develop significant efforts towards converting current franchisees back to full ownership. We therefore hypothesized plural chains to incorporate specific advantages that prevented its structure from being strategically transformed into an entirely vertically integrated form. Such positive aspects had not only to make the combined distributional channels better than just one form on its own, but they had also to compensate for those negative side effects (e.g. an increase in complexity and monitoring costs) that arise when dealing with two instead of just one organizational instrument. Theory suggests that the plural form possibly outperforms pure forms regarding a chain's organizing costs, its short-term growth momentum, its grade of total quality as well as its level of risk exposure. Subsequent empirical analysis identified -the forth central aspect -that improving their standards of total quality is the primary reason for successful franchisors to structure and to maintain their chains rather plurally than purely organized.
Winning support for the quality arguments and rejecting the remaining ones is even more meaningful when examining how these issues very distinctly affect the franchisor and his agents. Whereas using the dual structure to lower organizing costs, to improve short term growth or to optimize risk exposure generally promotes the company-owned arm of the system at the expenses of the franchising one, applying the plural form to improve a system's level of total quality benefits both franchisees as well as the franchisor's company-owned units. Thus as the fifth important aspect, empirical data indicates that successful franchisors prefer to cooperate with both types of agents and refrain from exploiting the franchising part opportunistically. Other studies support this hypothesis by presenting evidence that franchisors willingly abstain from using their full range of power towards franchisees. Whether it is granting of quasi-rents to franchisees, computing royalty rates based on revenue instead of on profit or keeping contracts steady despite varying conditions (e.g. geographically, macroeconomically, franchisee individually, etc.) 5 -these all indicate (voluntary) cooperative franchisor behavior despite a formal ability to make use of their opportunistic power towards agents.
It is this fifth aspect that will receive further analytical and empirical coverage within the following sections. First we will study the formal power structure of franchise systems, focusing on power asymmetries that favor the franchisor and leave the franchisee with a rather small amount of countervailing power. Secondly it will be analyzed how, despite these power asymmetries, franchisors achieve to credibly convince franchisees that they would not have to suffer from detrimental opportunistic actions applied by the still powerful franchisor. Finally we will investigate the financial consequences of such cooperative action, hypothesizing that cooperative franchisors may be eventually more successful in the long term than their likely opportunistically acting competitors.
Power distribution in franchise chains
Those franchise systems, that we are concerned with, begin their business existence when some individual or group will have developed a marketable business concept that contains both a product and a service as well as a plan for its successful distribution under a common trademark. Instead of fully vertically integrating the distribution channels, the owner (the franchisor) decides to sell some or all of the contractual rights for using the concept to legally independent business individuals (franchisees). In return for a variety of fees 6 , the franchisee is permitted to use the concept within the limits defined by the franchisor. He is simultaneously expected by contract not to change or adapt the concept without the franchisor's approval. Within such franchise arrangements, power -such as the ability of some individual or 5 Ehrmann (2002 Ehrmann ( ): 1137 Ehrmann ( -1144 Commonly these are a one-time franchise fee due upon joining the system, ongoing royalty rates for using the trademark and marketing fees supporting efforts in national advertisement.
group to control or influence the behavior of another -can be exercised by both contracting parties towards each other. The franchisor's sources of power enable him to apply both coercive and non-coercive forces to achieve control over his franchisees. Due to the surveys of French/Raven (1959) and Hunt/Nevin (1974) we know that coercive power is based on the franchisee's anticipation of possible punishment by the franchisor in case of non-compliance.
The four means of non-coercive force on the other hand originate from the franchisor's ability to exert reward, legitimate, referent and expert power. For each case the amount of noncoercive power is determined by the franchisee's expectation of how effectively the franchisor is able to grant rewards for obedience, how intensely the franchisor deserves compliance for being the legitimate superior, how much the franchisee refers to the franchisor's goals as those that also benefit himself and how strongly the franchisee accepts the franchisor's expertise as being equitable. The sum of coercive and non-coercive forces determines the potential of the franchisor's gross power, which in turn is reduced to net power by the franchisee's ability to countervail the principal's force. According to Emerson (1962) , controlled members such as franchisees may build up anti-power by reducing their motivation to follow the given goals, by seeking alternative gratification sources of those goals, by improving their ability to adjust the goals according to their own wishes, and by opposing the former alternative sources for achieving the principal's goals. 7 One practical example for increasing negotiating power vis-à-vis the franchisor lies in the forming of franchisee interest groups, a phenomenon highly visible especially at large franchise chains. In total, a franchisor's net power over his franchisees results from the sum of gross power corrected by the amount of franchisee countervailing power. As long as the total of such net power differs from zero, we assume the power structure of the franchisor-franchisee channel to be asymmetric.
As stated above, at the core of every business format franchise agreement the franchisee is granted the right to use the concept according to the franchisor's rules. Therefore to safeguard the business model as well as the good (i.e. compliant) system members against detrimental actions by bad system members, franchisors need to maintain a net power setting greater than zero between themselves and their franchisees. Ideally such asymmetrical allocation of power 7 These issues are more deeply discussed by Etgar (1976) . Note that according to Gaski (1984) , p. 25, the countervailing agent power is of different nature than the power exerted by the principal. "Countervailing power is channel member B's ability to inhibit channel member A's power over B's decision variables … Countervailing power does not refer to B's ability to control A's decision variables. That is B's power over A and represents a parallel structure. … B's ability to get A not to do something A would otherwise have done (countervailing power) is formally equivalent to B's ability to get A to do something A would not otherwise have done (power). The only operational difference is the target decision variable set." Within a broader economical context, Galbraith (1956) , p. 111, therefore defines "countervailing power" as "restraints on power" -alternatively one could term it "countervailing of power" as well.
favoring the franchisor benefits the entire system and thus both contracting parties. This is the case as long asymmetry is not abused by the stronger member for single-sided exploitation of the weaker members.
For the franchisor to use his powers effectively when building an environment of franchisee compliance, he needs to know that the strength of his gross power is determined rather by what power channel-members believe he is willing and able to exert, than by what he could really exercise. As Lusch/Brown (1982) have demonstrated, the more a subordinate channel member B (the franchisee) believes another superior channel member A will use potential coercive instruments, the more power A has over B. Thus in order to establish an environment of compliance, the (presumed) existence of coercive power is important, exercising it though is not. Moreover empirical work by Hunt/Nevin (1974) suggests that the franchisee's satisfaction level increases as the principal prefers the use of non-coercive forces to coercive ones to run the organization. Gaski (1984) proposes that exercising power to influence a channel member's behavior decreases the satisfaction of that individual and thus increases the potential of intrachannel conflict. Unexercised power is supposed to work exactly the opposite way by increasing the member's satisfaction and by decreasing the likeliness of channel conflict.
Practically, an increase in satisfaction will probably improve both the franchisee's morale and his cooperativeness, and will simultaneously reduce the likeliness of voluntary contract termination, the filing of lawsuits against the franchisor and demanding further protective legislation. 8 In total, seeking franchisee satisfaction should be a major task on the growth-oriented franchisor's to-do list. And indeed, franchisors widely refrain from first using coercive means of power as long as other, non-coercive forces are available. As outlined in a study of franchise channels by Frazier/Summers (1986) , principals seem to use coercion with great reluctance, "only when other types of influence strategies have failed to produce a satisfactory response on an important issue". Concerning the impact of an asymmetrical power structure on the effectiveness of a channel organization, their conclusion is twofold. First: "The positions of the manufacturer and its dealers tend to be more congruent when the manufacturer has high power based on the dealer's dependence in the interfirm relationship. Furthermore, the manufacturer is able to make more effective use of information exchange under these conditions.
These factors tend to reduce the manufacturer's need to engage in overt influence attempts (both coercive and non-coercive) with its dealers." And second: "Manufacturers with high power are better able to utilize non-coercive influence strategies (e.g. requests) effectively when overt influence attempts seem appropriate, and thereby avoid the use of coercion."
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As we understand from this analysis, even though the (presumed) existence of coercive forces in the hands of the franchisor -widely adding to an asymmetrical power structure -is vital to establish and to maintain compliance among subordinate channel members and thus to increase a system's organizational effectiveness, using non-coercive means instead will positively impact the agent's satisfaction with the system. However, prior to joining a franchise system with asymmetrical power structure, even potentially compliant members have to anticipate the application of damaging power if the franchisor should decide to act opportunistically. Thus for franchisors to attract good franchisees it is crucial to credibly signal their restraint from exercising opportunistic action by abusing their dominant power, both ex-ante and ex-post of the agent signing the contract.
3 Managing the franchisee's ex-ante risk
The process that prospective franchisees are supposed to complete when considering joining a franchise system has been well documented by a variety of consulting sources. 10 Generally they advise franchisees to narrow the possible alternatives to a finalist group by matching the available business opportunities with their own preferences. Subsequently, and in order to decide on one system, the applicant should thoroughly research his targets' strengths, weaknesses, chances and risks by using public (e.g. rankings, awards) as well as disclosed (e.g. the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC)) information and, important, by interviewing the franchisor as well as current and former franchisees. Resource consuming evaluation processes intend to match the agent's needs with those of the principal, to select the optimal work environment for the franchisee and to find an investment prospect where risks and opportunities are balanced according to the investor's profile and where the entrant's investment is well protected against avoidable (capital) loss.
Opportunistic franchisor behavior is one of the most prominent of such preventable risk factors as its impact on the franchise investment performance is extraordinarily detrimental.
Therefore large parts of the system selection process are concerned with finding a franchisor that will neither abuse his principal power ex-ante nor ex-post of signing the franchise agree-ment. 11 The more franchisees feel exposed to investment uncertainty, the more a franchisor is challenged by the following two issues: Firstly, prospective franchisees will be deterred from joining the system ex-ante if one or more competitors are able to credibly offer a more secure work environment and a more promising investment opportunity, i.e. one in which the perceived risk to incur capital damage due to franchisor opportunism is smaller, everything else being equal. And secondly, existing franchisees could be motivated to leave the system as the perceived risk of being treated unfairly begins to outweigh the supposed upside potential from being a member of the chain.
Taken together, both scenarios cause more substantial harm to the franchisor's reputation if made public, further increasing the difficulty of winning new members to join the system and thus to maintain a durable strategy of system growth.
Statistics on intra-channel disputes demonstrate the importance of a trustworthy franchisor- violations. Less frequent were disputes dealing with the non-renewal of agreements (10%), development rights (7%), lease claims (3%), the sale of a franchise business (2%) and customer service (2%). Assuming that the number of disputes settled over the NFMP resembles a small but representative fraction of all lawsuits filed between franchisors and franchisees in 1997, the prospective franchisee's concern about minimizing conflict potential seems justified. Moreover the higher the agent's investment, the greater will be the risk of capital loss in case of opportunistic franchisor behavior. Therefore it seems just rational for franchisees to ask additional sureties from the franchisor against detrimental principal conduct as investment volumes and/or asset specificity increase.
11 It is the primary intention of disclosure statements like the (UFOC) to provide detailed information on the franchise system and thus to protect the agent from disadvantageous surprises ex-post of signing the contract. 12 Data is available at www.franchisemediation.org (10/01/04). 13 According to www.franchiselaw.net (10/02/04), encroachment is defined as "the situation when a franchisor opens a company-owned unit or allows a franchisee to open a franchised unit near another franchisee's unit. If the franchisee with the first unit suffers economic harm as a result of the opening of the new unit, that franchisee may have a claim against the franchisor for encroachment. Encroachment can also be caused by a franchisor selling goods or services in a franchisee's territory through non-franchised channels of distribution." There is no reliable data on the numbers of franchisors granting exclusive territories to franchisees. Personal interviews with franchisees though support the thesis this is a rather rare option to be offered. Franchisors seem to prefer to remain in charge of decisions concerning the exploitation of geographical entities.
Such commonly used securities can be of public relational, of contractual or of financial nature. The first group contains measures like participating in franchise system evaluations (e.g. the yearly Franchise500 by the Entrepreneur Magazine), publishing internal franchisee satisfaction surveys, a membership of interest groups like the NFMP, or the submission to the standards of the AAFD which promotes the fair franchising seal. 14 Such public relational measures intend to visibly strengthen the franchisor's reputation as being a fair and nonopportunistic contracting partner. The second group of contractual measures includes concessions like the installation of a powerful franchisee advisory council-type organization that has a role in decision-making and to which the franchisor is contractually committed (Selden (2000)). The effect of the long-term contract of signaling the franchisor's motivation, not to appropriate the franchisee's rents opportunistically, is another powerful contractual instrument. Finally a third instrument for the franchisor to signal cooperativeness is to offer financial support for franchisees that are about to invest into the system. By risking personal equity and thus holding a stake in the franchisee's venture, franchisors are able to signal their willingness to share some of the financial risk encountered by franchisees.
The following quantitative analysis uses contractual and financial instruments to explore whether and how franchisors achieve to overcome franchisee's ex-ante uncertainty. . 15 Through the lack of appropriate data, public relational instruments could not be tested within this process. selected franchisors had to request an investment volume ("Intercept") of less than two million dollars. 16 For the purpose of analyzing organizational measures in chapter 4, we employ Lambda as the degree of franchising -this measure is arrived at by dividing the number of franchised outlets by the number of all (franchised and company-owned) units. Linear regression results are displayed in tables 1 and 2 below. They reveal significant support for the hypothesized franchisor objective to contractually and financially compensate franchisees for increased investment risk. According to tables 1 and 2 the duration of the franchisee agreement is strongly and positively correlated with the required investment volume. This is meaningful for franchisees as two coercive means of franchisor power are affected when terms increase: extraordinary contract termination, and the denial of contract renewal.
Concerning the first issue, franchisors are generally not supposed to unilaterally cancel the franchise agreement unless there was a breach of contract by the franchisee. The actual definition of a violation that suffices to end a franchise contract as well as the proper mode of applying it, is largely determined by national or local legislation practices, by the franchise ethic standards that apply and by the actual practicability to execute the written sanctions. In the Regarding the second issue of denying the renewal of a contract, some states require "good cause" similar to that needed for terminating the contract. Others oblige the franchisor to give the franchisee advance written notice of non-renewal and impose restrictions such as repurchase of the franchisee's assets or the waiver of any non-competition restrictions. 21 In total, we agree with Bradach (1998) that both termination and non-renewal are formal and powerful instruments, but actual enforcement of them is limited by legislation, by ethic standards, or simply by not being practical. Despite these restrictions, the threat of contract termination and non-renewal constitute the franchisor's ultimate tools to align the agent's conduct or to ultimately cancel any individual membership for the sake of all other system participants. Hence increasing the length of contracts diminishes the power of these means, which is true especially for the non-renewal threat. A franchisor appropriating a franchisee's rent through opportunistic action (e.g. by terminating the franchise relationship before the franchisee has been able to amortize his investment)
would prevent the franchisee from realizing profit on his investment and would consequently lose eligibility to negotiate third-party financing like the described SBA-loans. Qualification for offering financial assistance through third-party institutions should therefore be regarded as a positive signal by any prospective, risk-conscious franchisee. Neutral screening is a means to create a trustworthy franchise business model and to reduce uncertainty in the fran- 22 The reported reactions concerning lawmaker's idea to introduce restrictions of termination, demonstrate some of the importance of these tools for the franchisor. As Brickley/Dark/Weisbach (1991, p. 116) state: " The termination laws were opposed by major franchisors. The International Franchise Association (IFA), the primary lobbying group for franchisors, expended considerable resources opposing them … A major argument used by the IFA is that documenting good cause for the marginal franchisee 'would be difficult at best', hence the laws are equivalent to granting franchisees 'perpetual contracts'. The IFA argues that perpetual franchises make it difficult, if not impossible, to control quality within franchise system." 23 41,2 % of the 343 chains offer in-house financing, while 76,7% arrange contacts to third-party sources. These figures stand in contrast to those of the IFA in their Profile of Franchising (1998) study, where of 1226 chains 32% offered in-house financing, while only 10% have so called third party sponsored financing programs. 24 The United States Small Business Administration, www.sba.gov (10/10/04).
chisor's fair conduct. 25 The findings of tables 1 and 2 indicate that franchisors provide additional financial assistance as investment volumes increase substantially. With the degree of investment uncertainty correlated positively to the size of the investment volume, franchisors seem to signal cooperative conduct through offering additional financial support via independent third-party institutions.
In summary, both contractual and financial concessions work to ease ex-ante barriers that could otherwise deter potential franchisees from joining especially systems requiring a high investment volume . Simultaneously they measure the franchisor's ability to exercise coercive power against system members. As expressed in the IFA's position, set out in footnote 22, limiting franchisor power by means of termination makes the punishment or the expulsion of detrimental system members, and thus the maintenance of uniform quality standards, more difficult. Regarding the balance of power between a principal and an agent, in order to reduce the ex-ante uncertainty of franchisees, the franchisor consequently sacrifices part of his principal power. Doing this, he becomes more dependent on an increasingly powerful agent. As a result of this kind of shift in power, the franchisor retains a smaller range of means to protect the good members of the system from harmful actions by inferior system members. Due to the importance of the franchisor as the central guardian of system quality, we suspect this net-loss in power to be detrimental to the franchisor and to all good franchisees.
Along with an investigation of this hypothesis, the following part of the paper researches how franchisors may substitute the loss of coercive power with a gain in non-coercive means. As we will state, they may become more trustworthy simply by effecting adequate organizational changes.
Managing the franchisee's ex-post risk
Just like any rational investor, a prospective franchisee will want to protect his investment against unwanted risks when joining a franchise chain. 26 As demonstrated in the results of H1 and H2, franchisors perform contractual and financial changes in order to create a more fair and trustworthy franchisor-franchisee relationship, which is supposed to guarantee restraint 25 The UFOC demands a description of any assistance available from the franchisor or its affiliates in financing the purchase of the franchise. 26 We are fully aware that there are more risk factors for franchisees to consider prior to joining a system than just being exploited by an opportunistically acting franchisor. Obviously we picked one issue out of a broad spectrum that seemed central for us. Risk factors like choosing the wrong business model, the wrong vicinity for the outlet or just the wrong time for starting and many more still remain problematic even after the perfectly fair franchisor has been identified.
from franchisor ex-ante opportunism. The franchisor's forfeiture of coercive power, which is a consequence of these measures, is detrimental in two respects.
Firstly, both concessions -extending contractual terms, and using its reputation to acquire third-party financial sources -shield the agents from exploitation only as long as the franchisor intends to manage and to grow the system for a time exceeding the duration of the fran- Secondly, shifting away the power from the franchisor by means of contractual and financial adjustments results in substantial changes in a chain's economics. One extreme way of limiting franchisor power is by making more difficult the principal's ability to cancel a franchise contract through the introduction of legislation restricting termination of franchise contracts.
After the introduction of the so-called franchise termination laws, Brickley/Dark/Weisbach (1991) found that franchisor give up on an important instrument of controlling quality standards and, at the outmost, of punishing misconduct by withdrawing the franchise agreement.
As the cost of controlling the behavior and the performance of system members increase, the franchise channel becomes less efficient and makes a prospective company-owned arm look more attractive. 27 According to Brickley/Dark/Weisbach (1991) , such a strong unilateral restriction of franchisor power results in decreased system efficiency, in transfers of control 27 Note the diametrical intentions that are behind a franchisors strategy to substitute franchisees with companyowned units as the first become economically less preferable (because of increased controlling costs as termination laws are adopted), and a franchisor managing growth by adding more company units than franchise ones in order to benefit from the advantages of a plural form structure! away from the franchisor, and in significant wealth losses for the chain's shareholders.
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Without taking appropriate counter-measures, the erosion of franchisor coercive power appears to destabilize the franchisor-franchisee relationship and to be detrimental to the franchisor and to the franchisees.
Apparently, successful franchise systems need to insure agents ex-ante and ex-post of signing the contract against opportunism by the principal. While the first is achieved via contractual and financial adjustments, any approach to insure agents against the second will simultaneously need to provide the franchisor with appropriate means to prevent a disadvantageous loss of overall power of the principal. According to the model developed by French/Raven (1959) and Hunt/Nevin (1974) , a principal's net power is defined by the sum of his gross power minus an agent's countervailing power. The scope of coercive and non-coercive forces defines the strength of the gross power. As has been explained in chapter 2, non-coercive means are based on the franchisor's ability to exercise legitimate, expert, referent and reward power. In contrast to coercive means of power, all of them are generally positive to the system performance. As Ehrmann/Spranger (2004a) reveal, significant improvements of a system's total quality are achievable as a rather pure franchise system is transformed into one that is more plurally structured. Plural franchise systems profit from signaling internal information to outsiders, from aligning formerly diverse interests between its actors, from accelerating the processes of innovation, and from fostering competition between franchise and company-owned units. Moreover, all of these benefits concerning total quality strongly increase a franchisor's non-coercive power potential. Thus adjusting the organizational structure of franchised and company-owned outlets and allowing for a more plurally organized franchise chain diminishes the risk of ex-post franchisor opportunism and results in a beneficial regaining of power by the franchisor.
In detail, the sources of shifts in power that apply to plural structures are fourfold: Firstly, every company-owned unit has to be set up by investments of the franchisor. Being a rational investor, the franchisor should avoid any self-investment if he has little confidence in the success of his business model. The existence of company-owned operations therefore increases 28 Other researchers have concluded that asymmetrical power distribution within cooperational arrangements stabilizes the entire system and therefore is one important success factor (Herrfeld (1998) , Kuester (2000) ). Bonus/Wessels (1994) find power within franchise chains to be benefiting for all system members. Frazier/Summers (1986) and Sibley/Michie (1982) argue that vast franchisor power should not generally be abolished. It is rather the actual and individual usage of this power that determines the success of the franchisorfranchisee relationship. the franchisor's financial dependence on the success of the business model. Operating company-owned units successfully serves as a signal of trust towards all agents. It substantially increases the franchisor's credibility 29 and expands its own important legitimate power. Secondly, through the ownership of some units, the franchisor's interests as a principal become more lined up with those of his agents. 30 By aligning initially non-congruent profit schemes, the franchisor accepts the financial concerns of his franchisees and thus enhances, in their view, the perceived degree of expert power. Thirdly, the franchisor of a plural structure may benefit by each organizational form's specific strengths to improve the innovation processes.
While franchises are stronger in the exploration of opportunities, company-owned units prefer the exploitation of existing innovations. 31 Thus by balancing both aspects through mixing the organizational forms, the system's innovational power is raised. By accelerating innovation processes through the plural form, the franchisor simultaneously develops referent power.
And finally, the plurally organized franchise chain creates a more competitive environment where benchmarking franchisees against managers of company-owned units leads to increased system performance. 29 See Gallini/Lutz (1992) , Michael (2000) . 30 See Lewin-Solomons (1999) . 31 See Sorenson/Sørensen (2001) , March (1991) . 32 See Bradach (1997) and Bradach (1998) . 19%) . 33 In total, the regression results of tables 1 and 2 offer strong support for H3.
For the sample used in this study, company ownership is significantly positively correlated to the magnitude of the required investments. As the above arguments suggest, the more franchisees are supposed to invest in a franchise business, the higher the risk they will face, and thus the more the franchisor has to engage in company-ownership himself.
Although we lack instruments to reveal sequential causalities of the selected parameters, the empirical results allow us to hypothesize over the pattern that evolves between the franchisor and his franchisees: When joining a franchise chain, agents request credible insurance against franchisor opportunism. As the franchisee's risks of suffering capital losses increases with rising investment volumes, the quantity of insurance given by the franchisor needs to augment concurrently. By providing additional financial sources and long-term contracts as investment volumes increase, franchisors demonstrate abstinence from ex-ante opportunism. In turn though, these securities cause a loss of coercive franchisor power which weakens the necessary power asymmetry between the principal and his agents. By establishing a plural form structure, and engaging into company ownership as investment volumes rise, franchisors subsequently (need to) insure agents against detrimental ex-post opportunism. Becoming more dependent on the system's success, they will also protect all good members of the chain from deleterious behavior by opportunistic agents. Equally important, franchisors restore the former power asymmetry by gaining non-coercive powers due to the quality effects provided by plural franchise systems. While reducing ex-ante uncertainty of franchisees can be achieved through contractual and financial measures, only the introduction of an appropriate organizational structure seems to be powerful enough to insure agents against fatal ex-post opportunism. 34 What remains to be analyzed is whether offering securities against opportunism and refraining from agent exploitation is a rewarding franchise strategy. 33 Pénard/Raynaud/Saussier (2002) compute a mean Lambda of 67% (standard deviation 68%) for 521 chains from France. Lafontaine/Shaw (2001) receive a mean Lambda of 78% (71%) for 4842 U.S. and Canadian franchise chains. 34 Franchise consultants regularly perceive the successful running of company-owned units to identify a cooperative franchisor. On the other hand, buying back franchise units, especially prime sites, and reconverting them into company stores is viewed as indicating an opportunistic franchisor. Such franchisors use company stores 5 Consequences of cooperative franchisor management Any assessment of a business strategy will be naturally biased by two factors: Firstly, the definition of "success" will be subjective according to the preferences of the evaluator. And secondly, the availability of appropriate data will limit the choice of parameters along which success can be determined. Financial resources like balance sheets, income statements or stock prices are common means to evaluate the success of a business model. 35 With a minority of all franchise firms being publicly traded at stock exchanges, other parameters need to be identified to measure the success of franchising strategies. We therefore propose employing As has been argued above, franchisors put into operation financial, contractual and organizational adjustments to their system in order to signal to their agents the franchisor's abstinence from opportunistic behavior. If these measures positively influence the development of the chain, those systems being governed rather by cooperative franchisors should achieve significantly stronger growth than those of less cooperative principals. According to the results in tables 1 and 2, a franchisor is perceived to offer a higher amount of cooperation the more plurally the chain is structured. Concerning the efficiency of cooperative franchisor behavior, we therefore hypothesize (H4) the degree of franchising (Lambda) to be negatively correlated with absolute outlet growth.
as a tactical instruments for appropriating the highest returns of the chain -a behavior strongly warned off by consultants. 35 In an attempt to investigate how termination laws affect the wealth of the franchisor and the franchisee, Brickley/Dark/Weisbach (1991) examined stock returns of Californian franchise firms around the introduction of these restrictions in . They obtained only 32 publicly traded companies of that appropriate data was available. 36 Extreme values are: Growth in stores (Min -1302/Max 24432); Growth in percent (Min -89%/Max 16923%).
For the subsequent analysis of H4, the highly heterogeneous sample can be separated into three clusters of growth: The first set includes systems (N=31, 28%) of negative growth. From 1979 to 2003, these chains, on overage, grew by -40% in number of outlets. The second cluster (N=50, 44%) contains chains of small to medium growth rates, growing by 157% in 24 years. The third set (N: 31, 28%) finally consists of systems that achieved extremely strong growth, surging by more than 1300% in outlets over the time covered.
As displayed in table 3 below, the three sets reveal very distinct organizational structures.
While strong (SG) and medium (MG) growth chains (sets 2 and 3) are plurally structured with a very similar degree of franchising, negatively (NG) growing systems (set 1) operated far fewer company-owned units and almost completely relied on franchisees alone. 1999 1997 1995 1993 1991 1989 1987 1985 1983 1981 1979 Year % Franchising (LAMBDA) Strong Growth (N:31) +1353%
Medium Growth (N:50) +157%
Negative Growth (N:31) -40%
Concentrating on the extreme examples of growth for set 1 and 3, the results of the group statistics (table 4) and of the independent sample t-test reveal even more distinctions in parameters beyond the degree of franchising.
According to table 4, the strongly growing chains are not only more plurally organized, but they also charge their franchisees a higher initial investment and offer longer terms for franchise contracts than their negatively growing competitors. On average, SG-chains offer greater financial support to their franchisees, both for in-house and for third-party sources. The results of all of these tests clearly support H4. Plural franchise chains of the dataset grow significantly stronger, they request higher investment volumes and offer longer contracts than the rather purely structured systems. Interestingly, total outlet growth is fueled by an increase in franchise and in company-owned units and not by a substitution of one form for the other.
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Other than the Brickley/Dark/Weisbach (1991) report for their sample, franchisors of the SGand MG-chains successfully accompany contractual and financial concessions with beneficial organizational adjustments. As every new company-owned outlet requires the franchisor to invest in the system, he becomes more dependent on the chain's success as the plural form takes over. The more the franchisor requires the agent to invest in the system, the stronger is the signal that evolves from running company-owned units. Hence the franchisee's ex-post risk of being exploited opportunistically is substantially lower when joining a plurally organized chain instead of the purely structured system. The data researched in this paper suggests that franchisees respect the franchisors' signal for cooperation and reward such cooperative franchisor management by joining the chain in larger numbers.
The findings of this paper correspond to transaction cost theory. Due to empirical data of Dahlstrom/Nygaard (1999) , intrachannel opportunism causes frictions stemming from costly bargaining, from monitoring and from maladaption. Bargaining costs result from negotiation between transacting parties (Milgrom/Roberts (1991) ), monitoring costs are expenditures to guarantee the fulfillment of contractual obligations to the best interest of the channel members (Lal (1990) ) and maladaption is costly because of deficient communication and poor coordination between contracting partners (Reve (1986) ). Those costly frictions can be reduced by improving the quality of two governance mechanisms: formalization and interfirm cooperation. While the level of formalization is determined by the scope of written franchise contracts, its force is naturally limited by the inability of contracting partners to define rules ex- 38 Compare table B of the appendix for the highly significant correlations between Total Growth-Growth_FU, Total Growth_Growth_FU and Growth_FU-Growth_CU.
ante for every thinkable situation of a business relationship. For this reason interfirm cooperation is inevitably needed to accompany formalization, as it stabilizes and guides a partnership precisely during those situations which formalized contracts are unable to specify. Reducing franchisor opportunism in franchise channels, both ex-ante and ex-post of signing the contract, is therefore highly efficient and, as demonstrated, an important determinant of strong chain growth.
Concluding remarks
The purpose of the preceding pages has been to examine solutions to conflicts arising from asymmetrical distribution of power between contracting partners of franchise systems. With a franchisor's net-power over his agents being greater than zero, franchisees initially anticipate uncertainty of being exploited opportunistically both ex-ante and ex-post of signing the franchise agreement. As has been demonstrated, franchisors meet rising agent uncertainty (which, for example, increases as the required investment volumes rises) by offering longer contractual terms as well as by providing additional monetary support to franchisees. Whereas the first instrument weakens the franchisor's scope to terminate or to deny renewal of contract before the franchisee's investment has been amortized, the second puts a franchisor's equity and reputation at stake if an agent is exploited opportunistically. Thus both contractual and financial concessions effectively alleviate franchisee's ex-ante barriers and make joining the system more attractive.
The franchisor though, by lowering ex-ante barriers, automatically sacrifices part of his ability to exercise coercive power over his agents, which is detrimental if the franchisor's role, of centrally guarding quality standards against harmful influence, is jeopardized. By increasing company ownership, franchisors are able to re-establish the former power asymmetry. The advantages of such organizational changes are twofold: Firstly, they gain non-coercive means of power through the quality effects of the plural form. Secondly, by becoming more dependent on the system's success, they need to rely more closely on cooperative interaction with all of their agents. Any emphasis of cooperative behavior thus greatly reduces the agent's risk of being exploited opportunistically.
Concerning a chain's economics, exchanging a franchisor's coercive means of power with non-coercive means results in truly buoyant economical benefits for the system. Chains that credibly signal cooperation generate significantly stronger growth, both for the companyowned and the franchise outlet arms as well as for the entire system.
To both franchisors and franchisees, the recommendations based on the findings of this paper are straightforward: Franchisees on the one hand need to acknowledge that a strong franchisor in nothing to be afraid off in the first place (Frazier/Summers (1986) ; Sibley/Michie (1982) ).
Franchisors hold centralized power to achieve concerted effort from all channel members towards meeting a chain's primary challenges of adding new units to the system, of maintaining uniformity across all outlets, responding locally when appropriate and keeping the system flexible for adaptation to new threats or opportunities (Bradach (1998) ). Without the ability to exercise the utmost coercive power, the franchisor exposes the entire system, including all compliant members, to be vulnerable to manipulation by a small minority of non-compliant agents. Franchisors, on the other hand, need to anticipate and to manage the franchisee's uncertainty of being exploited opportunistically by the potential asymmetry of franchisor power.
Therefore they should initially use coercion with the greatest reluctance and do so only when other means of exerting influence have failed to achieve a satisfactory result (Frazier/Summers (1986)). Using non-coercive means while coercive force is available will increase both franchisee compliance (Lusch/Brown (1982) ) and the satisfaction level (Hunt/Nevin 1974) . Additionally, cooperative management will relax intrachannel frictions and thus prevent costly litigation (Gaski (1984) ). And secondly, they need to install a mechanism providing them with more of these "other means".
With a cooperative signaling function, building a more plurally organized system does even more than just giving the franchisor additional non-coercive means in his arsenal. Taken together, the empirical results of this study suggest the cooperative aspects of the plural form reward the franchisor through superior outlet growth as systems mature. 
